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Abstract: This paper proposes to elect the days to pay accounts payable determinants and our 
findings strongly support that the accounts payable problematic is closely related to short term 
financial decisions with a positive and significative influence of firm’s profitability and size 
factors. The existence of a firm’s negative working capital is confirmed to influence strongly the 
reduction of the trade credit obtained from suppliers n Western Europe countries in parallel with 
a joint contribution of short and long term bank financing as a substitute from trade debt. Firm 
characteristics related to negative working capital and fixed assets level, jointly or alone, give 
more importance to the role of short term bank financing on substituting or reducing the volume 
of trade credit obtained from suppliers. Negative working capital reinforces the role of long term 
bank financing. It seems to induce the presence of a corporate cost reduction strategy to preserve 
or increment the firm’s market reputation and competition. The firm’s return on assets implies an 
enlargement of the days to pay accounts payable  in line with a rising creditworthiness. All 
interacted variables are responsible for the reduction of the days to pay accounts payable and the 
confirmation of the financial substitution effect introduces more financing discipline compatible 
with firm’s cost reduction strategy and pricing motives included in a price discrimination 
strategy. Signs of future unbalanced capital structure and financial distress may appear due also 
to the more banking financing justified by firm’s investment  and negative working capital under 
finance motives point of view. The more firm’s growth the less trade credit obtained and, on the 
contrary, profitability and size contribute to facilitate the trade credit obtained from suppliers 
under finance and pricing motives point of view, more ver the stability on terms trade credit. As 
important as the days to pay accounts and/or days sles outstanding determinants are future 
investigations related to trade credit duration gapas a synthesis of the prior trade credit issues, to 
country and economic sector or union analysis, as well.
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Corporate trade credit has been regarded as one of the most interesting and 
important topics in the finance field for a long time. This type of short-term 
financing is especially relevant not only among large publicly listed corporations 
but also for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Some empirical evidence 
on the main determinants of a firm’s short-term debt, which includes trade credit as 
well as short-term bank financing and other short-term financing, is necessary 
given that firms follow a pecking order when they choose their sources of finance 
(Cosh and Hughes, 1994; Ang, 1991; Holmes and Kent, 1991). The fact that there 
is an industry-specific element to trade cedit intensiveness (Fishman and Love, 
2003) further supports the need to better understand which factors drive companies 
to use this type of financing. Previous studies provide a series of explanations with 
respect to the use of trade credit by corporations. Most of this research focuses on 
accounts receivables (Smith, 1987; Emery, 1984; Ferris, 1981; Nadiri, 1969) and 
their explanations are proposed in light of two main motivations: the financing and 
the pricing motives. Some papers that also investigate firms’ use of trade credit 
propose alternative explanations, which among others include the cost advantage, 
market power and tax arguments (Soufani and Potziouris, 2004). And other studies 
analyze the the relation between trade credit and the bank lending channel (Nilsen, 
1999) and the importance of trade credit as a comple ent to lending by financial 
intermediaries (Séverin et al., 2004, Demirguc-Kunt a d Maksimovic, 2001). 
In developed countries, both small and large firms use trade credit to raise funds 
and can decide to borrow either from banks or from trade partners. But these 
sources of finance are not completely interchangeable (Miwa and Ramseyer, 
2005), which means that they are used simultaneously by corporations and each of 
them has its own specificities. Regarding trade credit, previous finance literature 
attempts to explain its use by corporations. A stream of research emphasizes the 
importance of trade credit when analyzing the relation between raw materials and 
products in terms of value (Fishman and Love, 2003). Trade credit can also be 
used as a strategic instrument in oligopolistic supplier markets and when higher 
competition exists in resource markets. Additionally, firms sometimes provide 
credit to their customers as a way to give them enough time to test the products 
efficiently, which implies that trade credit can beconsidered as a guarantee for 
product quality. In this respect, the possibility of incurring in “sunk funds” due to a 
supplier-customer relationship in which tailor-made products are involved can be 
an important reason to increase the amount of trade credit (Fishman and Love, 






Other studies highlight that trade credit can be industry-specific by showing that 
there is little variation within industries and a wide variation across industries in 
terms of credit (Nilsen et al., 1999). These results are supported by subsequent 
research that finds that trade credit intensiveness is industry-specific and that the 
differences across and within industries in terms of trade credit found previously 
persist over time (Fishman and Love, 2003). Finally, recent finance literature 
proposes an agency theory perspective to explain trde credit, as an alternative to 
the tax, liquidity, transaction costs and product quality explanations (Bastos and 
Pindado, 2007). These authors base their arguments on he adverse selection and 
moral hazard phenomena, all of them focused on accounts receivables, and find a 
negative relation between the days of sales outstanding and the days to pay 
accounts payable.  
Overall, Bastos and Pindado (2007) conclude that the agency theory is a better 
candidate than the alternative traditional models to explain trade credit policy. The 
results in this study are complemented by Niskanen and Niskanen (2006), who 
document that larger and older firms with more inter al financing are less likely to 
use trade credit whereas firms with a high ratio of current assets to total assets and 
firms subject to loan restructurings use more trade credit. In this context, in which 
few studies, if any, attempt to disentangle the factors that determine companies’ 
accounts payable, our main objective is to identify the main determinants of trade 
credit policy as measured by the days companies have to pay their accounts 
payable.  
To achieve this objective, we base our explanations on the financing and pricing 
motives of trade credit. In so doing, we contribute to the finance literature by 
complementing prior research that focuses on the bank financing substitution effect 
of trade credit. Our empirical evidence also emphasizes the importance of trade 
credit as a source of funds (Miwa and Ramseyer, 2005) and its use as a signal of 
firms’ creditworthiness (Antov and Atanasova, 2007; Frank and Maksimovic, 
2005), and we contribute to the stream of the literature that highlights the stability 
of trade credit contracts (Blasio, 2005). Finally, our paper is also related to the 
pricing motives of trade credit (Soufani and Poutziouris, 2004).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the 
literature most closely related to our paper and present our testable hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the empirical models and the variables used in the analyses. 
The data and the estimation method are presented in Section 4. The results of the 









2. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 – Trade Credit and Short Term Bank Financing 
Bank financing and trade credit are closely related to each other. On the one 
hand, accurate information about companies’ financil wealth is particularly 
important to both trade creditors and bank financial providers. On the ohter hand, 
trade creditors have a financial advantage over banks i  the acquisition of 
information because they can obtain it by regularly visiting the buyer (Mian and 
Smith, 1992). Althouhg previous studies assume that firms consider trade credit as 
a second best alternative to bank financing in terms of growth promotion, it is not 
so clear that the substitution of trade credit for bank financing fosters industry 
competition (Fishman and Love, 2003). Recent works suggest that financial 
intermediaries can play an important role in the promotion of economic growth by 
helping to allocate capital to those firms with value-creating projects. Additionally, 
borrowing in the form of trade credit can become an alternative source of funding 
for firms that operate in poorly developed markets (Fi hman and Love, 2003). 
Short-term bank financing is one of several alternative sources of funds that can 
be regarded as a complement to trade credit in order to foster industry competition 
(Fishman and Love, 2003) and that can be used by corporations to reduce their 
transaction costs when they need to refinance theirdaily activities (Ferris, 1981). 
The relation between trade credit and short-term bank financing can also be 
analyzed in the context of financial crises. Specifically, prior research finds that the 
provision of trade credit increases right after the crisis, but it subsequently 
collapses in the following months and years (Love et al., 2007; Fishman and Love, 
2003). It is particularly important to determine whet er short-term bank financing 
can be a tool that promotes corporate growth and whether it is used by corporations 
either as a substitute or as a complement to trade debt. A company in a weak 
financial position tends to reduce the amount of trade credit offered to their 
customers in times of crises. Therefore, the reduction in aggregate credit provision 
is in part driven by the reduction in both trade and bank credit that follows a 
banking crisis. Under these circumstances, firms that previously acted as financial 
intermediaries and provided trade credit to other companies decide to reduce such 
facilities, thus leading to a reduction in the availability of liquidity in the form of 
trade credit (Love et al., 2007). In a credit rationing context, Cunningham (2004) 
confirms that trade credit is used by medium-wealth nd low-wealth firms to help 
ease bank credit rationing. 
Given the previous discussion, we can conclude that trade credit can become an 
effective but weak substitute for bank credit when the latter is unavailable 
(Fishman and Love, 2003). By contrast, some empirical works suggest that trade 





thus facilitating access to bank debt (Séverin et al., 2004; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2001). Alternatively, the demand of trade credit in the form of 
accounts payable can be considered as a way to obtain short-term financing, which 
is extensively used by corporations to postpone immediate cash payments and 
increase the cash flow available inside the company (Pike et al., 2005, Soufani and 
Poutziouris, 2004). Finally, with respect to the relation between trade credit and 
short-term bank financing, it should be noted that t e ability of firms to obtain 
trade credit may be affected by the enforcement or information problems that 
prevent bank financing operations (Fishman and Love, 2003). 
In relation to the use of trade credit as an alternative source of funds, Guariglia 
and Mateut (2006) show that firms use trade credit demanded to suppliers as a 
substitute for institutional finance at the margin when they are credit constrained, 
which contradicts previous findings by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Clearly 
(1999). Along the same lines, both small and large firms in well developed 
countries use trade credit to raise substantial funds and can choose to borrow either 
from banks or from trade partners, but in a simultaneous way, which suggests that 
bank loans and trade credit cannot be treated interchangeably (Miwa and 
Ramseyer, 2005). 
Given the previous discussion and the arguments that support that bank 
financing may act as a substitute for trade credit funding, we formulate the first 
hypothesis of the paper as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: Short-term bank financing has a negative effect on trade debt as 
measured by the days to pay accounts payable. 
Hypothesis 1b: Short-term bank financing has a positive effect on trade debt as 
measured by the days to pay accounts payable. 
 
2.2  – Trade Credit 
It is expected that a reduction in the days sales out tanding may imply a 
consequent reduction in the days to pay accounts payable, excluding the financial 
distress case where a reduction in the sales payment outstanding is parallel with an 
increase of accounts payable (Preve, 2003). Inversely, an enlargement of the days 
sales outstanding (accounts receivable) will imply an enlargement of the days to 
pay accounts payable; i.e., a better implementation of short term trade credit 
strategy on the receipt of accounts receivable willprovide a reduction on the 
volume of accounts payable1, compatible with a cost reduction strategy. It is 
                                                
1 The aim of some studies is to predict whether a transaction will be settled on due date or at 
most within 10 days past the due date or not among a generic five-class transaction rating 
system; one of them found that the naïve no-change model  (0-10 days delay in payment) 
performs best in terms of overall efficiency of classification (over 80% of transactions are 





recognizable to know if the bilateral or multiple rlationships between companies 
is made proof that can be beneficial for both or all involved (Petersen and Rajan, 
1997, 1995, 1994) and if trade credit offers solutins to informational asymmetries 
between buyers and sellers, product quality uncertainty reduction concerning buyer 
payments intentions and price discrimination opportunities (Pike et al., 2005). 
More over, the purpose of decisions related to the extend of trade credit is to 
encourage customers to purchase goods and/or services and jointly with 
inventories are investments that are necessary for day-to-day operations of the 
business (Drake and Fabozzi, 2008).  
In terms of comparative advantage, firms should obtain external financing from 
financial institutions and markets and lend to some classes of borrowers in order to 
optimally exploit their advantage in managing trade cr dit. Firms in countries with 
large, privately owned banking systems offer more trade credit to their customers 
and take more financing from them, suggesting that trade credit is a complement to 
lending by financial institutions and should not be vi wed as a funding substitute 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001). The amount of credit extended to a more 
creditworthy buyer is an increasing function of seller creditworthiness in 
conjunction with the special nature of the explained variable and to an 
unchangeability of credit terms time measure by firm’s trade credit contracts 
stability over time (Blasio, 2005). Trade credit is a short term corporate financial 
source and accounts that firms simultaneously take and extend credit to other firms 
with similar levels of creditworthiness (Frank and Maksimovic, 2005) besides the 
differences across financial systems (Demirguc-Kunt a d Maksimovic, 2001). 
Another very important corporate advantage of trade credit is determined by inter-
firms relationship, where trade credit helps firms to improve their reputation and 
can work as a signal about firm’s quality and thus facilitates access to bank debt 
(Séverin et al., 2004; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001). Recent findings 
support the conclusion that trade credit have a reltiv ly high use and some 
evidence is showed in favour of a stronger trade credit channel than bank credit 
channel, with the aim of jointly considering the roles played by trade credit 
received and extended (Guariglia and Mateut, 2006). More over, the days of sales 
outstanding are negative and directly related to the days to pay accounts payable 
(Bastos and Pindado, 2007). It is also expected that the trade credit’s dynamic 
remains quite unchangeable (Soufani & Poutziouris, 2004). It is known the 
effective firm power to decide over the trade credit volume extended to clients and 
the high inelasticity of firms on trade credit demanded to suppliers. It it is not sure 
that high quality firms are prone to increase the trade credit offered to clients or 
                                                                                                                                              
likely future payment behaviour from its own analytical accounts in ledger and this is the most 





that clients use the same argument to demand more trad credit from suppliers. 
Considering the last previous arguments, we are in position to formulate the 
following hypothesys: 
Hypothesis 2a: The days of sales outstanding have a neg tive impact on the days 
to pay accounts payable. 
Hypothesis 2b: The days of sales outstanding have a positive impact on the days 
to pay accounts payable. 
 
2.3 – Trade Credit and Profitability 
The negative or positive evolution of net income, as a percentage of firm total 
assets (return on assets), is one of the most important sources of information about 
the negative or positive performance of corporate op rational cash flow and, 
consequently, in the firm ability to enlarge or reduce the correspondent days to pay 
accounts payable, in alignment with Deloof and Jegers, 1999. The higher the 
external financing costs is the higher will be trade credit obtained from suppliers, 
even conditioned by other trade credit determinants like ratios of trade credit’s 
capacity of access (no statistically significant) (Cos and Hernando, 1999) or firms 
in relation of group, as a long term debt significant lternative (Deloof and Jegers, 
1999). If trade credit has been considered by firms as the second best alternative to 
bank financing why claim that trade credit exists only to reduce transaction costs 
besides being the main source of corporate financing in USA (Wilner, 2000)? In 
order to minimize short-term financing costs and grant the financing working 
capital requirements, corporations issue commercial paper instead of seeking bank 
loans. It corresponds to an alternative to short-term bank loans and recognizes that 
they reduce short term financing costs in comparison with bank loan (Nippani and 
Pennathur, 2004) and it has been a perfect solution to reduce transactional costs 
relating to those have chosen prompt payment (Emery, 1987, Ferris, 1981; Nadiri, 
1969). It is possible to argue that financial development contributes to the 
reduction of the transaction costs of payments and will benefit firms with high 
transaction costs (Fishman and Love, 2003) and the trade credit financing has been 
a mean to effective a price discrimination on the goods markets by a firm, allowing 
(getting)  a prompt payment discount (Petersen and Rajan, 1997, 1994; Mian and 
Smith, 1992; Brennan et al., 1988; Schwartz and Whitcomb, 1979). Some detailed 
information on the cost of inter-firm credit was provided by the investigation from 
the italian manufacturing sector and the empirical evidence supports the argument 
that italian case is different from the one usually considered as “normal” , instead 
of being acknowledge to be confined to other develop d countries, as United States 
or Germany, with a cost hierarchy between trade credit and the cheaper bank credit 





Low percentage of suppliers offering discounts for quicker payments, long 
period agreements, low incidence of penalties for late payments must be 
considered the main justifications to those italian specificities and no evidence was 
met to confirm a cost hierarchy (even in an internatio al comparison) in obtaining 
bank credit firm’s context (Marotta, 2005, 2000). It is recognized that discounts 
offered (obtained) have the expected effect on the reduction of payment delays 
mostly for customers located abroad where customary credit periods are shorter 
and creditors’ rights protection is more effective and this way of funding is more 
expensive than loans. In addiction, this result is consistent with the poor 
explanatory power of discounts for the trade debt period of domestic firms 
(Marotta, 2005). Firms experiencing both growth sale  and profits demand trade 
credit and the relationship is positive (Pike et al., 2005; Soufani and Poutziouris, 
2004). In turn, accounts payable are an interest fre orm of short term financing 
and many companies use them to the last day possible before payment is due 
(Soufani and Poutziouris, 2004), trade debt is the largest source of short term 
financing for american corporations (Wilner, 2000; Petersen and Rajan, 1997) and 
the bilateral or multiple relationships between companies is made proof that can be 
beneficial for both or all involved (Petersen and Rajan, 1997, 1995, 1994). 
But profitability may be involved in a corporate short term strategy to support a 
financing complement to the days to pay accounts payable, improves firm 
creditworthiness (Antov and Atanasova, 2007; Frank and Maksimovic, 2005) and 
confidence between sellers and buyers in the market nd, finally, a higher volume 
of trade credit obtained from suppliers. Taking into account previous arguments we 
may present the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: A positive relationship is expected between the days to pay 
accounts payable and return on assets.  
 
2.4 – Trade Credit and Debt  
Debt ratio has been considered as a significant alterna ive for trade credit, 
specially as a long term-debt granted by linked firms. In this way, the volume of 
trade credit taken plays an important role on the corporate financing policy (Deloof 
and Jegers, 1999; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Nilsen (1999) found that firms 
increase trade credit as a substitute of bank credit, in icating for both small and 
large firms and trade credit may play a significant role in short term corporate 
finance, confirming that the amount of trade credit a buyer takes is determined by 
the amount of capital he needs and by the internally generated cash, confirming the 
“pecking order” theory (Mayer and Sussman, 2004).  
But the use of trade credit is propitious since unlike commercial paper it is 
widely used by the small firms suffering the loan decline and the main alternative 





firms are financially constrained (such as the case of start-ups) they use more trade 
credit, after being measured by their internal cash production and the price of their 
bank debt as a transaction cost concern, as well (Huyghebaert, 2006). Firms 
borrow from banks when they anticipate needing money for relatively long periods 
and do not substantially change the amount of theirloans in response to changes in 
their financial status but change the amount of their trade credit in response (Miwa 
and Ramseyer, 2005). The use of trade credit creates better conditions t  obtain 
institutional loans and also contribute to lower total borrowing costs (Antov and 
Atasanova, 2007) accordingly to the findings that firms substitute bank credit with 
trade credit during money tightening (Meltzer hypothesis) (Blasio, 2005). A trade 
partner knows his borrower’s industry first hand (he is in the industry) while 
bankers may know how to run a heavily regulated financial intermediary, they 
know far less about the industries in which their bo rowers compete and don’t have 
a special or comparative advantage in monitoring, then banks only lend if firms 
can offer either third-party guarantees or security in erests in property (Miwa and 
Ramseyer, 2005).  
Nonetheless, bank loans and trade credit must not be treated as financial sources 
interchangeably and disproportionately they borrow from banks when previous 
decisions determine money needs for relatively long periods and turn to trade 
credit when they have to face short-term money needs not expected (Miwa and 
Ramseyer, 2005). A negative loan decision by financial intermediaries might 
increase the level of accounts payable and a close relationship with the lending 
bank allows a firm to take advantage of the trade credit discounts offered or 
obtained (Niskanen and Niskanen, 2006). Both bank and trade credits operate side 
by side and trade credit have stronger effects than b k credit (Guariglia and 
Mateut, 2006). At last, analysing the trade credit in corporate groups, it was found 
that long term financial debt is a significant alternative for trade credit, specially 
long term debt granted by linked firms (Deloof and Jegers, 1999) and specially 
when firms present negative working capital which is usually a firm’s long term 
financing asset. Facing to previous arguments it is po sible to formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4a: Debt ratio has a negative effect on the days to pay accounts 
payable, in line with the substitution effect. 
Hypothesis 4b: Debt ratio has a positive effect on the days to pay accounts 
payable, in line with the substitution effect. 
 
2.5 – Trade Credit  and Sales Growth 
It has been shown that industries with higher dependence on trade credit 
financing have higher rates of growth in countries with weaker financial 





internal generation of funds (Ranjan and Zingales, 1998). The same findings 
suggest that their results imply that trade credit is used as a source of “financing of 
last resort” by very constrained firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1997), growth of sales 
have a positive relationship with trade credit (receivables) confirmed in all size 
firms (Soufani and Poutziouris, 2004) and demonstrated that there is a positive and 
autonomous effect of the relative level of purchases on the share of trade credit in 
total assets as well (Deloof and Jegers, 1999). In a country with an economic 
developing environment, it is important to understand the trade credit role on 
young and mature firms (trade credit as a long term relationship with a larger trade 
credit volume (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999).  
The conclusions are very important on convincing that for younger firms trade 
credit is lesser accessible source of substitute financing than mature firms, because 
they have not yet had a chance to proof a clear firm’s reputation for 
creditworthiness. In terms of interaction between accounts payable and external 
financing, the results of the same study confirms the significance of growth of 
sales and trade credit terms remains unchangeable but suggesting that the trade 
credit financing provides a positive effect on growth. Trade credit financing affects 
growth in the average size of firms rather than the growth in the number of firms 
or, about the interaction between accounts payable nd external financing, the 
results suggest that trade credit financing provides a positive effect on growth 
independent of the external financing one (Fishman and Love, 2003). Firms 
experiencing both growth in sales and profits demand trade credit and the 
relationship is positive (Pike et al., 2005; Soufani d Poutziouris, 2004). It was 
found that an important driving force behind the decision to provide (demand) 
trade credit is the urge to be competitive on both establishing a solid market power 
and reputation. Firms’ head quarters are located in countries with an 
underdeveloped banking sector with effective growth expectations (Van Horen, 
2005) and when financing access is granted by banking institutions the days to pay 
accounts payable are l sser dependent from the impact of sales or income growing 
(Soufani and Poutziouris, 2004). 
As growth is proposed to be measured by the evolution of sales over time and 
stating that the days to pay accounts payable are lesser dependent from the growth 
of sales, we are in position to formulate the following hypothesys: 
Hypothesis 5: It is expected a negative relationship between growth ratio and 
the days to pay accounts payables. 
 
2.6 – Trade Credit and Size 
Large firms increase trade credit, a more complex dcision since they are 
typically assumed to have wide access to other (bank) fi ancing, and the reasons 





increase trade credit and it was found that small firms increase trade credit as a 
substitute of bank credit (Nilsen, 1999). Firms after borrowing from banks and turn 
to trade partners when they face short-term exigences they did not expect and both 
large and small firms use trade credit to raise substantial funds (Miwa and 
Ramseyer, 2005). Larger and older firms with strong internal financing or cash 
flow are less likely to use trade credit but financi lly constrained firms use more 
trade credit as an alternative source of funding and that bank relationship increases 
loan availability to firms (Niskanen and Niskanen, 2006). More over some 
considerations about firm’s ability to access finance, their profit and growth or 
price discrimination, the decision to demand trade credit can also, to a large extent, 
be determined by firm size (Soufani and Poutziouris, 2004). 
It is important to know if the “size effect” may be considered as a or the only 
specific element on its relationship with the days to pay accounts (Fishman and 
Love, 2003). This is to confirm if the days to pay accounts are o  not significantly 
influenced by that “size effect” (Deloof and Jegers, 1999). On the other hand, to 
certify that “size effect” allow companies get more trade credit from firms (a more 
extended time to settle accounts payable) better positioned in the financial markets, 
This is because it has successively mentioned by prior investigations on this issue 
even knowing that smaller firms have the majority of trade credit allowed by 
suppliers (Emery, 1984; Schwartz, 1974). Substantial findings were met under the 
agency theory perspective, emphasizing the strongly support thatsmaller firms, 
those with a smaller proportion of fixed assets andthose that are less profitable 
extend more trade credit perhaps to growth faster. In turn, firms with a high 
proportion of variable costs and high percentage of bad debts extend less (Bastos 
and Pindado, 2007). Although, it was also found evidence that the decision to 
demand trade credit can, to a large extent, be determin d by the firm size (Soufani 
and Poutziouris, 2004). It also has been obtained evidence that corporate finance 
practice appears to be influenced mostly by firm size than shareholder orientation 
or national influences, but  fundamental differences b tween large and small firms 
were found as well, among other factors (Brounen et al., 2004).  
Taking into account the previous arguments we are in position to formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: A positive impact is expected between size and the days to pay 
accounts payable.  
 
2.7 – Trade Credit and Lagged Dependent Variable 
In prior section related to trade credit demanded an  extended (section 2.2) it 
was mentioned that the amount of credit extended to a more creditworthy buyer is 
an increasing function of seller creditworthiness. This is true in conjunction with 





terms time measure by firm’s trade credit contracts stability over time (Blasio, 
2005). This is important for a relatively stability of firm’s trade credit policy well 
running management. This is also important for the well running of corporate core 
business and for an acceptable management of firm’s working capital to achieve a 
desirable balance between the days to pay accounts payable and the days sales 
outstanding. 
Taking into account the previous arguments we present  the following 
hypothesys: 
Hypothesis 7: It is expected a positive impact of one year lagged dependent 
variable on the days to pay accounts payable.  
 
3. The Model and Variables  
 
3.1 – Model Design 
This section presents the model and variables that can help to identify the 
determinants of the days to pay accounts payable. It is not a formal analysis of 
working capital management but a way to graduate the importance of corporate 
short and long term determinants of trade debt staring from the main purpose of 
this work: finance motives and within the finance sub titution effect. The model 
here presented may be composed by two firm’s decision ets: DPAit=f(θ;ω), where 
θ represents the firm’s short term decisions set and ω the firm’s long term decisions 
set. What is proposed in the basic model is to built a six hypothesis model analysis 
to explain the days to pay accounts (DPAit) in Western Europe’s countries and to 
know the most important corporate determinants ableto explain its behaviour. 
The basic model design is presented as follow: 
 
DPAit = ß0 + ß1(DPA)i,t-1 +  ß2(BFL) it +  ß3(DSO)it +  ß4(ROA)it +  ß5(DLT) it +  ß6(GRO)it +  ß7(SZE)it + εit         (1) 
 
        Short Term Decisions Set                     Long Term Decisions Set 
 
where the explanatory variables of the model are as follows: DPAi,t-1 denotes the 
lagged explained variable for which it is expected a positive relationship with the 
days to pay accounts explained variable (DPAit), accordingly to the special nature 
of this explanatory variable and to an unchangeability of credit terms over time and 
in line with firm’s trade credit contracts stability over time (Blasio, 2005);  BFLit 
stands for short term bank financing in the period t, DSOit stands for the days sales 
outstanding in the period t, ROAit stands for return on assets in the period t, DLTit 
denotes the debt ratio in the period t, GROit stands for turnover growing ratio in the 
period t and SZEit denotes the firm size ratio in the period t (see Appendix I and II) 





 The extended model is intended to give consistency to the basic model and 
reinforce the influence of (abroad) profitability on the days to pay accounts 
payables. For this purpose it is proposed an interact d variable relating a country 
dummy (DUCOit) variable in interaction to firm’s return on sales (ROSit), 
represented by (DROSit) and firm’s return on assets (DROAit). Both to follow better 
expectations about corporate discipline on trade crdit coming from abroad 
operations. As referred before it is recognized that discounts offered (obtained) 
have the expected effect on the reduction of payment d lays mostly for customers 
located abroad where customary credit periods are shorter and creito s’ rights 
protection is more effective. This way of funding is more expensive than loans 
(Marotta, 2005) where customary credit periods are shorter and creditors’ rights 
protection is more effective. Despite relation with a comproved improvement on 
creditworthiness (Frank and Maksimovic, 2005) and beneficial for both or all 
involved (Petersen and Rajan, 1997,1995,1994). More over due to the fact that 
inter-country firm relationships brings to a grater discipline in current financial 
operations represented by a supply contractual respect of the days to pay accounts 
payables to foster a better systemic position on a more, competitive, international 
and global markets. Because of all argumentss aligned for profitability explanatory 
variable, it is proposed the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 8: There is a negative impact of country to return on sales interacted 
variable on the days to pay accounts payable. 
 Hypothesis 9: There is a negative impact of country to return on assets 
interacted variable on the days to pay accounts payable. 
 The one interacted variable extended model will be then described as follows:  
 
DPAit = ß0+ ß1(DPA)i,t-1+ß2(BFL) it +ß3(DSO)it+ß4(ROA)it+ß5(DLT) it+ß6(GRO)it+ß7(SZE)it+ γ1(DROS)it + εit    (2) 
 
followed by the two interacted variables extended model:  
 
DPAit = ß0+ß1(DPA)i,t-1+ß2(BFL) it+ß3(DSO)it+ß4(ROA)it+ß5(DLT) it+ß6(GRO)it+ß7(SZE)it+ γ1(DROS)it+ 
 
+ γ2(DROA)it +  εit             (3) 
 
 Accordingly to our model the main firm decisions relat d to the influence on the 
days to pay accounts payable are presumed to be from sh rt term ones. But without 
any exclusive determination and all basic model hypothesis expected to be strongly 
confirmed by the firm characteristics model referred below. In complement to the 
above extended model, it is proposed the use of single and both fixed assets and 
working capital levels, as two other important role f certain firm characteristics 
which may support the strength of our model results, in complement of the three 





 In terms of proportion from total assets, we compute FASit as the firm fixed 
assets/total assets ratio reflecting asymmetric problems related to the conflict of 
interests between buyers and sellers where the high value of fixed assets the high 
asymmetric information. It is expected a negative effect on the days to pay 
accounts payable due to the more fixed assets levelthe less trade credit obtained 
from suppliers. One of the most important corporate characteristics is the working 
capital included in the model as a dummy variable (DWCAit) and representing the 
working capital effect, subjected to the following conditions: 
 
= 1,  if WCAit < 0 
           DWCAit 
= 0,  if WCAit ≥ 0 
  
 For the working  capital variable is expected a signif cant and positive impact in 
the explanation of the days to pay accounts payable due to the simultaneous rising 
role of short term and long bank financing and consequent additional financial 
costs. This increase in bank financing and corresponding costs may involve signs 
of future unbalanced capital structure and signs of financial distress, specially in 
the case of persistent and negative working capital when entered into the basic 
model. As far as it is known, this phenomena has not been investigated before, 
alone or together with firm fixed assets level. The introduction of these firm 
characteristics also represents an in ovative approach to better explain the 
previous firm’s days to pay accounts payable basic model. The two interacted 
variable extended model to certain firm characteristics as a influencing role of the 
days to pay accounts payable explanation is presentd as follow: 
 
DPAit = ß0+ß1(DPA)i,t-1+ß2(BFL) it+ß3(DSO)it+ß4(ROA)it+ß5(DLT) it+ß6(GRO)it+ß7(SZE)it+ γ1(DROS)it + 
 
    + γ2(DROA)it+ß8(FAS)it + ß9(DWCA)it + εit                                             (4) 
 
3.2 – Variables 
 
3.2.1 – Dependent Variable 
Prior studies have developed substantial research on the trade credit 
determinants and low companies’ relationship levels with banks confirm high trade 
credit volume (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Deloof and Jegers, 1997) and an 
excessive trade credit theories contrasts with a very reduced number of empirical 
and test studies in small and middle companies withvery difficult conditions to 
access capital markets (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Trade credit may be considered 
a source of funding of non financial companies and a mechanism to reduce 





Hernando, 1999) and not directly between banks and borrowers firms. Trade credit 
also represents a long term relationship with a larger trade credit volume 
(McMillan and Woodruff, 1999) with its influence on economic growth in poorly 
developed financial markets and shows that industries with higher dependence on 
trade credit financing exhibit higher rates of growth (Fishman & Love, 2003). 
Perhaps one or the only paper that considers the accounts payables as an explained 
variable using significant elements of belgian firms balance sheet structure as 
explanatory variables in corporate groups developed a model where is attributed a 
significant role to growth and size as explanatory variables (Deloof and Jegers, 
1999)2. The days to pay accounts payables and the days sales outstanding are the 
most important tool to establish a relationship betwe n economic (purchases, sales) 
and financial operations (payments, collections) respectively. That relationship 
may be represented by the days to pay accounts payable (DPAit) which so far it is 
known there have been a very reduced number of empirical investigation and plays 
an important and dynamic role in corporate trade credit policy. 
 
3.2.2 – Independent Variables 
After the dependent lagged variable (DPAi,t-1) for which it is expected a relevant 
and stable explanatory power, the first explanatory variable is the ratio (BFLit) 
(degree of importance of short term bank financing in current assets) as a financing 
alternative or complement to trade debt in the whole short-term corporate 
financing. The following explanatory variable is the days sales outstanding, 
(DSOit) knowing that the short-term corporate financing balance is usually 
dependent on the way and intensity the company establishes actively the receipt of 
product sales and less directly or actively the payment terms. In terms of 
profitability (ROAit) the grater profitability, here represented by return on assets, 
usually corresponds to the first step to achieve grater cash-flow margins essential 
to allow a better performance from the days to pay accounts payable on its 
enlargement and acting (or not) over the days sales outstanding firm’s policy. The 
debt ratio (DLTit) besides the most important and numerous studies developed until 
now debt determinants are the main objective to characterize the firm’s capital 
structure. As referred before and following our hypothesis, long term bank 
financing also remains as important as necessary to finance the accounts payable 
under stable debt firm conditions and knowing that it is important to keep a good 
on-going relationships within or/and between the companies. No corporate strategy 
ignores the long term conditions of activity growth, measured by the time 
                                                
2 According to the National Bank of Belgium, in 1995 accounts receivable formed 16% of total 






evolution of companies turnover measured by the variable (GROit) considered the 
most appropriated because it is generally possible to insure activity growth without 
additional exploitation investment in assets and measures a real “growth effect”. 
At last, size never must be subestimated under the financial point of view, 
measured by the variable  (SZEit) which corresponds to the “size effect”, even in 
the short-term corporate financing synthesis represented by the days to pay 
accounts payable; integrated in the firm characteristics to moderate the model, 
FASit is an explanatory variable related to the firm fixed assets ratio and DWCAit is 
a dummy variable related to the firm’s  working capital. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
 
4.1 – Data and Sample Description 
Another key issue is related to the fact that, for instance, leading theories of 
capital structure can explain some but not all aspect  of the data and no single 
theory is an adequate description on its own. This is because reality is more and 
more complicated than even the most-sophisticated and up-to-date theories or 
econometric methods may suggest. We agree with the stat ment that the most 
developed empirical methodologies will provide in the future the development of 
new more sophisticated theories in finance, in general and also in trade credit, in 
particular (Mayer and Sussman, 2004). 
As stated further, the sample will include observations, on the years from 1990 
to 2002 of different types of public, non-public and on-financial companies 
belonged to nine Western European countries. It also includes 13.054 observations, 
1.322 companies related to nine European countries from an unbalanced panel data 
related to 1990-2002 period which is required as a necessary condition since one-
year data is lost in the construction of turnover growth variable (see Appendix II) 
and another year-data is lost because of the estimation of the model in first 
differences and four year consecutive information is required in order to test the 
second-order serial correlation, as pointed out by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Finally, the second-order serial correlation is due because the GMM estimation 
method is based on this assumption. The countries involved in this investigation 
are as follows: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain. Some lack or insufficient data information was responsible for 
the exclusion of 3 european countries: Italy, Denmark and Norway and one year: 
2003. For each of them it was constructed an unbalaced panel of non-financial 
companies. Its selection was ranked accordingly a criteria of relative importance in 
the european economy and data availability able to provide a density level of 
information and sample size enough to ensure a better xplanation from the main 





Summary statistics denotes a DPA ratio around 60 days and a DSO ratio higher 
than 100 days, both in average. The source of information was based on the 
Worldscope Datastream of public and non public firms of the mentioned nine 
western European countries. Table 1 shows the distribution by each european 
country of our sample, represented by number and percentage of observations and 
companies. The Table 2 provides the expected signal of the coefficients of all 
explanatory variables and summary statistics for the variables used in our 
investigation are presented in Table 3; finally, the results of the basic and extended 
models are in Table 4 and, finally, the results of firm influencing characteristics 
variables are showed in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
4.2 – Methodology 
Given the aim of this research, the western european countries data panel 
analysis seems to be the methodology most accurate to d termine the main factors 
that influence the days to pay accounts payable on a given period of time and got 
from a diversified and enlarged data sample. In order to test the hypothesis related 
to our days to pay accounts payable determinants model, unlike cross-sectional 
analysis, a panel data methodology is used because it allows to control for 
individual heterogeneity and avoid biased results (Moulton, 1987, 1986). The 
mentioned basic and extended models have been estimated by using the data panel 
methodology, since there is two main reasons to justify our methodological choice: 
(1) Panel data methodology allows the research to control for individual 
heterogeneity and (2) The endogeneity problem. From the first reason, some items 
must be referred since individual heterogeneity in our study is very important 
because the accounts payable’s payments is also very closed or associated to each 
country. The control for such heterogeneity is by modelling it as an individual 
effect ηi which is then eliminated by taking first differences of the variables. In 
consequence, the error term, εit has been split into three components: (a) The 
above mentioned individual effect (ηi), (b) The time-specific effect by the 
corresponding time dummy variables (dt) essential for controlling the 
macroeconomic effects variables on the days to pay accounts payable and (c) 
Finally, the random disturbance (vit). Related to the second reason (endogeneity), 
the problem can be dealt by using the panel data methodology, in which the 
dependent variable  may also explain some of the explanatory variables. The 
mentioned models have been estimated by using a two-step system GMM panel-
data methodology with instruments, specifically forthe right-hand-side model 
variables, lagging from (t-1) to (t-4) as instruments. The potential misspecifications 
of the model were checked by using the Hansen statistic of over-identifying 
restrictions in order to test the absence of correlation between the instruments and 





Then, mi statistic developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) wasused to test the lack 
of second-order of serial correlation in the first-difference residual as Table 4, 5 
and 6 confirm no problem of second-order serial correlation in our models. Finally, 
the results mentioned in the same Tables provide good results for the three Wald 
tests, where z1 is the joint significance test of the reported coeffici nts, z2 is the 
joint significance test of country dummy variable and, at last, z3 is the joint 




5.1 – Results of The Basic and Extended Models 
 The results of the GMM estimation of the basic model (1) presented before 
correspond to coefficients of the explanatory variables statistically significant at 
1% level and are provided in the Column I of Table 4. The specification tests could 
help us to compare the models presented and the F-statistic: [(19,1321) = 
40.562,39] of the basic model (1) shows that the null hypothesis that all 
explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected.  
 The results are consistent with Hypothesis 1a where short term bank financing 
affects negative and very significantly the firm’s days to pay accounts payable: the 
more bank financing taken the less trade credit obtained from suppliers, in the form 
of the days to pay account payables. On the other hand, our results confirm 
partially recent research applying to be in presence of institutional finance as a 
substitute for trade credit not subjected to financi l limitations (Guariglia & 
Mateut, 2006) and of the substitution effect partly associated to Meltzer hypothesis, 
according to which firms substitute bank credit (trade credit) with trade credit 
(bank credit) in money tightening periods. Short tem bank financing may also be 
associated to implement a reduction transaction costs strategy by obtaining 
payment discounts under a price discrimination strategy (Ferris, 1981). Hypothesis 
1b is clearly rejected and short term bank financing is not complemente of trade 
debt, contrary to Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, (2001) findings.  
 In agreement with our Hypothesis 2a and contrary to Preve (2003)’s findings, 
our results don’t show that an enlargement of the days sales outstanding implies an 
enlargement on the days to pay accounts payable and confirm a negative but very 
slight relationship between them. And its irrelevant coefficient represents an 
unchangeability of credit terms over time and in lie with firm’s trade credit 
contracts stability over time (Blasio, 2005). This k nd of relationship and stability 
also recognizes that bilateral or multiple relationships between firms may be 
beneficial for both or all involved (Petersen and Rajan, 1997, 1995, 1994). It also 
confirms trade credit theory which accounts that firms simultaneously taking and 





(Frank and Maksimovic, 2005) and jointly play a rising influence on trade credit 
channel (Guariglia and Mateut, 2006), but without weaking the substitution effect. 
Finally, results confirm a very slight and negative relationship between the days 
sales outstanding and the days to pay accounts payable as mentioned by Bastos and 
Pindado (2007). Hypothesis 2b must be therefore rejected.  
The positive relationship between firms’ profitability and its days to pay accounts 
payable predicted in Hypothesis 3 is confirmed by our results which are also and in 
line with an enlargement of the days to pay accounts payable due to a better 
performance of firm’s profitability in order to obtain more trade credit from 
suppliers (Deloof and Jeggers, 1999). In our sample, firms experiencing 
profitability increase their trade credit obtained from suppliers, improve the 
conditions of its creditworthiness (Antov and Atanasova, 2007; Frank and 
Maksimovic, 2005) and reduce adverse selection. Complementarity from firm 
internal funding with the days to pay accounts payable was met as predicted in this 
hypothesis and it is recognized that more profitability corresponds to more credit 
obtained from suppliers and confirms an enlargement also predicted by Deloof and 
Jegers, 1999.  
 Financial leverage represented by the debt ratio is n line with prior researches 
that confirm long term bank financing as another important but not the main 
alternative source of external financing to trade credit (Deloof and Jeggers, 1999; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1997). It complements the conclusion the amount of trade 
credit a buyer takes can also be determined by the amount of capital he needs and 
by the internal generated cash but our results don’t allow to confirm the “pecking 
order” referred before by Cosh and Hughes (1994), Ang, (1991), Holmes and Kent 
(1991). But allows to state that it works quite well only in short term run as 
predicted by Mayer and Sussman (2004) besides a complementary role from long 
term bank financing as a second financing substitute of trade credit obtained from 
suppliers. On the other hand, our results seem to confirm that, when firms 
anticipate needing money, for relatively long periods, do not substantially change 
the amount of their loans in response to changes in their financial status. They 
borrow from banks but change the amount of their trade credit (debt) in response 
(Miwa & Ramseyer, 2005). All of these confirm what is predicted in our 
Hypothesis 4a pursuing firm purposes to reduce the trade credit obtained from 
suppliers and transaction costs by also obtaining payments discounts (Antov and 
Atanasova, 2007; Niskanen and Niskanen, 2006) to imple ent a more consistent 
reduction transaction costs strategy (Ferris, 1981). It may be in presence of a cost 
hierarchy between trade credit and bank credit favourable to profitability increase 
(Marotta, 2005, 2000). At last, confirm prior result  obtained from corporate 
groups that long term debt is another alternative for trade credit (Deloof and 





(Huyghebaert, 2006; Blasio, 2005). Our hypothesis 4b is undoubtly rejected by 
results.  
 The results of our sample analysis correspond to what was stated in our 
Hypothesis 5 on confirming the days to pay accounts payable ratio is lesser 
dependent from the impact of sales growing when financing access is granted by 
banking institutions (Soufani and Poutziouris, 2004). The relationship is negative 
instead of the positive receivables’ case (Pike et al.,2005; Soufani and Poutziouris, 
2004). In consequence, lower days to pay accounts payable are also essential to 
continue proofing a clear reputation for creditworthiness, a solid market power and 
competition also without the obligation to locate firm’s head quarters in countries 
with an underdeveloped banking sector with effective growth expectations as 
predicted by prior research (Van Horen, 2005).  
 As predicted by our Hypothesis 6, the results confirm that the decision to 
demand trade credit is positively related to firm size besides some considerations 
about firm’s ability to access finance, their profit and growth or price 
discrimination confirmed in all small, medium and large firms by findings of 
Soufani and Poutziouris (2004). Firm’s size finishs to influence the use of more 
trade credit with a relative stability even knowing is propitious since unlike 
commercial paper it is widely used by the small firms more suffering the loan 
decline (Nilsen, 1999). The results confirm that the “size effect” significantly allow 
companies, in general, get more trade credit from suppliers as successively 
mentioned by prior investigations on this issue (Emery, 1984; Schwartz, 1974). 
Accordingly to our Hypothesis 7, the findings of Blasio, (2005) are here confirmed 
by the results of our research and can sign the stability of contract firms related to 
trade credit demanded from suppliers over time which is important for a more 
stability of short term financial management of a firm. 
 The specification tests could help us to compare the models presented and the F-
statistic: [(20,1321) = 50.449,21] from this first extended model (2) show that the 
null hypothesis that all explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero cannot be 
rejected. The results of the GMM estimation of extended model (2) are presented in 
Column II of Table 4. As shown in this table, the signs related to our basic model 
hypothesis remain unchangeable and the coefficients of he explanatory variables 
included in this extended model continue statistically significant at 1% level, 
except for long term bank financing. As a matter of fact, once the interacted 
variable, DROSit, entered the model, this interacted country to return on sales 
variable is responsible for a statistically significant and determinant role on 
explaining the reduction of the days to pay accounts payables. At the same time, 
contributes to replace long term bank financing influence and confirms signs and 
relative importance of remaining explanatory variables. But firm’s return on assets 





more credit obtained from suppliers (Deloof and Jeggers, 1999) and improvement 
of firm’s creditworthiness (Antov and Atanasova, 2007; Frank and Maksimovic, 
2005), parallel to reduction of adverse selection. This seems to be responsible for 
the well short term running model (Mayer and Sussman, 2004) but excluding long 
term bank financing as a second financing substitute. In this one interacted variable 
extended model, hypothesis H1a, H2a, H3, H5, H6 and H7 from the basic model 
are confirmed and/reinforced its role on explaining the days to pay accounts 
payable. Regarding the very strong and negative influence (reduction on obtaining 
trade credit from suppliers) of the first inter-country profitability variable, our 
Hypothesis 8 is confirmed. Our innovative findings suggest that inter-country 
profitability relationship is a very influent variable to explain the reduction on 
trade credit obtained from suppliers, after short term bank financing influence, but 
it doesn’t confirm pecking order theory against prior findings (Cosh and Hughes, 
1994; Ang, 1991; Holmes and Kent, 1991).  
 The specification tests could help us to compare the models presented and the F-
statistic: [(21,1321) = 63.978,32] from the extended model shows that the null 
hypothesis that all explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero cannot be 
rejected. The results of the GMM estimation of this second extended model (2) are 
presented in Column III of Table 4. As shown in this table, the signs related to our 
basic model hypothesis remain unchangeable and the coefficients of all the 
explanatory variables included in this extended model continue statistically 
significant at 1% level. Once the second interacted variable, DROAit entered the 
model jointly with DROSit are responsible in a very different scale (from: -46,3761 
to –5,4345, respectively) for the more statistically significant and determinant role 
on reducing (short term bank financing, days sales outstanding, long term bank 
financing, growth, interacted variables - mainly the intercountry firm return on 
assets) or on enlarging (firm’s return on assets and size) the days to pay accounts 
payable. Exception to long term bank financing all remaining explanatory variables 
increased its explanatory power to impact the days to pay accounts payable on 
obtaining more credit from suppliers (Deloof and Jeggers, 1999) and improving the 
firm’s creditworthiness (Antov and Atanasova, 2007; Frank and Maksimovic, 
2005). This is parallel to reduction of adverse selection or acting as financing 
substitute leaded by interacted firm’s return and bank financing, responsible for a 
well short term running model (Mayer and Sussman, 2004). It also represents a 
complementary role of long term bank financing as the last financing substitute of 
trade credit obtained from suppliers. In this two joint interacted variable extended 
model, hypothesis H1a, H2a, H3, H4a, H5, H6 and H7 from the basic model are 
confirmed and/reinforced its role on explaining thedays to pay accounts payable. 
Regarding the very strong and negative influence (reduction on obtaining trade 





Hypothesis 9 is also confirmed and substantial ratifies all the hypothesis from the 
basic model.  
 
5.2 – The Influencing Role of Firm Characteristics 
 Once the existence of a significant and stabilized inter-country negative effect 
on the days to pay accounts payable has been corroborated by the results, it was 
investigated whether or not certain firm characteris ics moderate the previous 
effects on the firm’s days to pay accounts payable using one and two interacted 
variables. Then we propose an evidence of the influe cing role played by two 
features: firm’s proportion of fixed assets and working capital. Signs of the 
coefficients related to our main hypothesis remain unchangeable and coefficients 
of the explanatory variables in the influencing extensions of our model continue 
statistically significant at 1%, but long term bank financing. The specification tests 
could help us to compare the models presented and the F-statistic of the firm 
characteristics’ models also shows that the null hypothesis that all explanatory 
variables are jointly equal to zero cannot be reject d.  
 Column IV of Table 5 reports the results of the model (3) including only the 
fixed assets effect. In this first sub-model [F(21,1321) = 59.608,34], its coefficient 
is negative, significant and confirms the more fixed assets proportion facilitates the 
reduction the trade credit obtained from suppliers but veneer by an increase of 
short bank financing. An increase in the positive influence of size are in line with 
prior investigations on size issue to facilitate thvolume of trade credit obtained 
from suppliers (Emery, 1984; Schwartz, 1974). This also reinforces at the same 
time a higher contribution of short term bank financing to a reduction of the days 
to pay accounts payable parallel to costs reduction. These also  seems to indicate 
that some fixed assets may be paid more by short term and less or not by long term 
bank financing. 
 The results of the influencing role of firm’s working capital effect alone are 
presented in Column V of the same Table 5, also corresponding to single firm’s 
characteristics model (3). In this second sub-model [F(21,1321) = 68.334,11], all 
the coefficients continue statistically significant and it is clear from our sample that 
working capital (working capital effect) plays in this model an important role on 
the enlargement of the days to pay accounts payable (Guariglia & Mateut, 2006). It 
happens together with an increase of bank financing and confirming once more 
that short and long term bank financing are solid an relevant substitutes of trade 
credit taken from suppliers (Fishman & Love, 2003). The working capital implies a 
great influence of return on assets on obtaining more credit from suppliers and 
growth influence is slightly higher. 
 Finally, the jointly contribution of both fixed assets and working capital effects 





presented in Column VI of Table 5. The results in this model (4) [F(21,1321) = 
75.826,42] continue to present coefficients statistically significant. It is sustainable 
that working capital plays a consistent role on the enlargement of the days to pay 
accounts payable when confirmed definitively that short and long term bank 
financing are solid substitutes of trade credit taken from suppliers (Fishman & 
Love, 2003) under a reduction transaction costs strategy by obtaining payment 
discounts (Ferris, 1981). In its turn firm assets profitability reinforcemnt allows 
confidence to suppliers (Emery, 1984); Schwartz, 1974). The contribution of firm’s 
fixed assets confirms its role to allow a higher reduction on the days to pay 
accounts payable and accept the considerations about firm’s ability to access 
finance firms’ size (Soufani & Poutziouris, 2004), confirmed by the highest level 
of short term bank financing. It also corresponds to a mechanism to transmit 
confidence to suppliers and allows firms to get more trade credit as mentioned by 
Emery (1984); Schwartz (1974). And creates better conditions to continue inducing 
a clear reputation for creditworthiness and solid market power or competition (Van 
Horen, 2005). This one interacted and two firm characteristic variables model 
works very well only in short term run as predicted by Mayer and Sussman (2004) 
with long term bank financing out of influencing the days to pay accounts payable. 
In this firms characteristics and one interacted variable extended model, hypothesis 
H1a, H2a, H3, H4a, H5, H6 and H7 from the basic model are confirmed 
and/reinforced its role on explaining the days to pay accounts payable. 
 Column VII of Table 6 reports the results of the model (4) including only the 
fixed assets effect. In this firm characteristics model [F(21,1321) = 71.203,16], its 
coefficient is negative, significant and confirms once more the more fixed assets 
proportion facilitates the reduction the trade credit obtained from suppliers but 
veneer by a slight increase of short bank financing. The firm’s characteristics 
models results confirm our previous findings encountered for models (1), (2) and 
(3) and associated to our hypothesis 1 to 7 (basic model) and 8 to 9 (extended 
models). The results of the influencing role of firm’s working capital effect alone 
are presented in Column VIII of the same Table 6, also corresponding to single 
firm’s characteristics model (4). In this fourth sub-model [F(21,1321) = 
83.752,65], all the coefficients continue statistically significant and it is clear from 
our sample that working capital (working capital effect) plays an important role on 
the enlargement of the days to pay accounts payable (Guariglia & Mateut, 2006). 
This happens together with an increase of bank financing and confirming once 
more that short and long term bank financing are solid and relevant substitutes 
from trade credit taken from suppliers (Fishman & Love, 2003) together with a 
reinforcement of return on assets effect on the days to pay accounts payable. On 
the other hand working capital is very often supported by long term bank 





Sussman, 2004) are also confirmed and complemented by long term bank 
financing as a suitable financing substitute of trade credit obtained from suppliers 
besides its relative influence change on the explained variable. 
 Finally, the jointly contribution of both fixed assets and working capital effects 
on the days to pay accounts payable was also investgated by estimating the model 
presented in Column IX of Table 6. The results in this model (4) [F(21,1321) = 
92.333,55] continue to present coefficients statistically significant and it is 
sustainable that working capital plays a consistent role on the enlargement of the 
days to pay accounts payable when confirmed definitively that short and long term 
bank financing are solid substitutes of trade credit taken from suppliers (Fishman 
& Love, 2003) and firm profitability allows a stronger confidence to suppliers 
(Emery, 1984); Schwartz, 1974). At last, in this firms characteristics and two 
interacted variable extended model, hypothesis H1a, H2a, H3, H4a, H5, H6 and 
H7 from the basic model are also confirmed and/reinforced its role on explaining 
the days to pay accounts payable. The innovative country-profitability interacted 
variables contribute to impact negatively the days to pay accounts payable in order 
to introduce better discipline in firm’s trade credit operations and firm’s 




 This investigation is also a corollary of the lack of research on trade debt and 
measured by the days to pay accounts payable. The results presented are very 
relevant and correspond to a successive improvement of our basic model results 
under our point of view as shown mainly in Tables 4, 5 and 6. The results of prior 
papers if they are not contradictory are at least un atisfactory to understand more 
completely or at least in a different way (in this research only using firm’s book 
values or ratios) the role of the dependent variable to be explained by our model: 
the days to pay accounts payable. The relatively strong and positive coefficient and 
the statistical significance from the dependent lagged variable to explain the days 
to pay accounts payable, as expected, is an unmistakable contribution to confirm 
the trade credit contracts terms stability over-time (Blasio, 2005). More over, it is 
confirmed by our models the substitutive skills of external bank financing in 
relation to trade debt dependent variable representd by the days to pay account 
payables, with a confirmation of a kind of abroad pecking order conditions. This 
substitution role is parallel to firm’s concerns in implementing a cost reduction 
strategy to increase profitability, to achieve a better firm’s days to pay accounts 
payable  performance without weaking all the factors related to market competition 
(Soufani and Potziouris, 2004), increment firm’s reputation and price 





interchangeably strong signs between the days to pay accounts payable and both 
short and long term bank financing (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2005) and the firm’s inter-
country relationships, based on return-on-sales and return-on-assets, are acting as 
consistent factors to increase reputation near suppliers, competitive position in the 
market and obtain transaction costs reduction (Van Horen, 2005). Financing and 
pricing motives are respectively responsible for contribution of the substitution 
effect of trade debt for bank financing associated to a reduction of transaction cots 
strategy of the firms integrated in our sample. Except for one interacted variable 
(DROSit) alone included in the correspondent extended model and combined with 
fixed assets firm characteristic all the basic model hypothesis were confirmed in 
significance and sign nature. Except on the fixed assets firm’s characteristic case, 
all predictions related to a short term well running model were confirmed (Mayer 
and Sussman, 2004), as well as in the basic model but with a confirmed change in 
its relative influence, where long term bank financing acts as a consistent and 
residual financing substitute of trade credit obtained from suppliers. In general 
terms, this research have achieved its purposes on confirming the bank financing 
and abroad profitability substitution effect but not stating periods of money 
tightening as predicted by Meltzer hypothesis, the raising of funds mentioned by 
Miwa and Ramseyer, 2005, strong contributions to creditworthiness also justified 
by profitability and financing risings (Antov and Atanasova, 2007; Frank and 
Mksimovic, 2005) and, at last, confirmation of pricing motives for promoting cost 
advantage and market power (Soufani and Potziouris, 2004). In terms of firm’s 
decisions set influence, all the explanatory coefficients show the more importance 
of short term decisions face to long term decisions set only in the one interacted 
variable extended model (2), Column II, in the one interacted variable with firm’s 
characteristics in model (3), Column VI, in the two interacted variables with fixed 
assets characteristic in model (4), Column VII and in the two interacted variables 
with working capital characteristic in model (4), Column VIII, from Tables 4 to 6. 
For further investigations it is recommended that ech, another countries or 
geographic groups of countries must be investigated to confirm our results or 
denote any other explanation factors related to a specific country or groups of 
countries effect and confirming what was not possible to do with our investigation 
which doesn’t allow to argue that trade credit exists because of inefficiencies in the 
financing market, that is, firms that have better access to finance may act as 
intermediaries for firm with less access to the credit market (Soufani and 
Poutziouris, 2004; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). A sector analysis will provide 
specific performances of the days to pay accounts to be compared with the 
conclusions of this research. Even taking into account the existence of a relative 
trade credit contracts stability it is recommended to analyze the trade credit 





susceptible to complement or to obtain a useful synthesis of firm’s trade credit 
policy and/or trade credit risk taking associated to it. This is important because 
trade credit problematic is neither the only analysis of trade credit extended to 
customers nor the trade credit obtained from suppliers but also the synthesis of 
both as an important issue related to corporate finance. As a consequence of our 
results it is important to take into account the confirmed and rising importance of 
short and long term bank financing facing to some firm characteristics and not only 
to crise factors. Another recommendation to further and useful investigation is 
related to their possible disturbances on capital structure and a rising financial 
distress situation. These disturbances may put in question the future firm’s 
financial balance and increase its probability of bankruptcy. In special when exists 
high bilateral relationship dependence in which situat on not only less financially 
stable firms do prefer trade credit but all firms agree to pay a higher interest rate 
for trade credit (Wilner, 2000). This higher interest rate of trade credit is not 
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List of Variables Abbreviations and Definitions  - I 
Abbreviation Description Definition 
STDit Short term bank financing Value of short term bank financing 
CATit Current Assets Value of firm’s current assets 
ACPit Accounts Payable Value of firm’s accounts payable 
ACRit Accounts Receivable Value of firm’s accounts receivable 
CGSit Cost of Goods Sold Value of cost of goods sold  
TAit Total Assets Value of total net assets  
ARDit Accounts Receivable 
Days 
Number of days, in average, to receive 
from a customer 
INCit Net Income Value of net income of a company 
DPAit  Days to pay accounts 
payables 
Number of days to pay accounts 
payable, in average 
ROSit Return on Sales Firm’s return on sales ratio 
DUCO Dummy Variable European Country Dummy Variable 
Dit Long Term Liabilities Value of long term liabilities of a 
company 
Eit = CSKit + PSKit Book value of equity Book value of firm’s equity 
Tit Turnover in the period t Value of turnover in the period t 

























List of Model Dependent and Independent Variables  -  II  
Variables Description Definition 
DPAit (ACCP/CGS)it*365  Accounts payable days Number of days to pay 
accounts    
BFLit = STDit/TAit Short term bank financing Short term bank financing to 
net total assets  ratio 
DSOit =ARDit Days of sales outstanding Accounts receivable days: 
datastream definition   
ROAit = EBITit/TAit Return on assets Firm’s return on assets ratio 
DLTit = [D/(D+E)]it Long term debt  Long term debt level or ratio 
GROit = (∆Tt/ Tt-1)it Growth  Turnover growth rate, in a 
given period 
SZEit = ln(TAit) Size Firm size ratio 
DPAi,t-1  DPAit -1 lagged variable Days to pay accounts 
previous year                        
DROSit = DUCO*ROSit Interacted Variable Inter country and return on 
sales variable 
DROAit = DUCO*ROAit Interacted Variable Inter country and return on 
assets variable              
FASit = (TA-CAT)it/TAit Fixed Assets Firm’s fixed assets level  
WCAit = [CAT-
(ACP+STD)]it/TAit 
Working Capital Level Firm’s working capital level  
DWCAit = [ACRit-
(ACPit+STDit)] < 0 













































Austria 9 54 4,07% 498 3,81% 
Belgium 11 66 5,00% 715 5,49% 
Finland 10 82 6,21% 848 6,51% 
France 10 419 31,70% 4.131 31,64% 
Germany 10 419 31,70% 4.174 31,97% 
Greece 8 100 7,55% 838 6,41% 
Ireland 11 45 3,41% 481 3,69% 
Portugal 9 53 4,01% 487 3,73% 
Spain 10 84 6,35% 882 6,75% 
Total 10 1.322 100,00% 13.054 100,00% 
Notes: Data of companies for which the information is available for at least 13 consecutive years between 
1990 and 2002 were extracted. After removing the first year data and the last year because of insufficient 
data only used to construct several variables, the resultant samples comprises: 54 companies (498 
observations) for Austria, 66 companies (715 observations) for Belgium, 82 companies (848 observations) 
for Finland, 419 companies (4.131 observations) for France, 419 companies (4.174 observations) for 
Germany, 100 companies (838 observations) for Greece, 45 companies (481 observations) for Ireland,  53 
companies (487 observations) for Portugal and 84 companies (882 observations) for Spain. 
 
 
Table 2 – Variables and Their Expected Sign 
Phenomenon Variables Expected 
Sign 
Short Term Decisions:   
- BankFinancing                         (1a) BFLit - 
- Bank Financing                        (1b)   BFLit + 
- Days Sales Outstanding          (2a) DSOit - 
- Days Sales Outstanding          (2b)  DSOit + 
- Profitability                               (3) ROAit + 
Long Term Decisions:   
- Bank Financing                        (4a) DLTit - 
- Bank Financing                        (4b) DLTit + 
- Growth                                       (5) GROit - 
- Size                                            (6) SZEit + 
- Interacted Variable 1                  (8) DROSit - 
- Interacted Variable 2                  (9) DROAit - 




















Table 3  – Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
DPAit 59,9605 102,399 0,0292 6.828,542 
DPAi,t-1 59,9625 102,403 0,0292 6.828,542 
BFLit 0,10915 0,10656 0,0000 2,767325 
DSOit 100,7704 867,2852 1,0000 97563,0000 
ROAit 0,0669861 0,1092491 -4,704083 1,999117 
DLTit 0,4816213 0,307055 0,0000 0,9943777 
GROit 15,12454 1428,848 -0,9999657 163048,3 
SZEit 12,52708 1,888439 6,021023 19,13559 
DROSit 0,0142481 0,2447087 -16,36556 13,20075 
DROAit 0,0190078 0,0736639 -1,699278 1,999117 
Notes: This table provides the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, the maximum and 
the Pearson’ correlations for 10.344 observations. DPAit denotes the days to pay accounts 
payable, DPAi,t-1 accounts for the dependent lagged variable,  BFLit is the level of financing 
current assets by short term banking, DSOit is the days of sales outstanding ratio, ROAit is the 
firm’s return on assets, ROSit is the firm’s return on sales, DLTit is the debt ratio, GROit is the 
flow measure of growth in turnover, SZEit  is the firm size level and DROSit (return on sales 
































Table 4 – Results of the Basic and Extended Models (DROSit; ; DROA it) 
Variable I II III 
Constant 2,50976      (1,92678) 1,10040      (1,71205) -1,10765       (1,31499) 
BFLit -15,622***     (1,7293) -14,6209***   (1,5042) -16,3522***   (0,95461) 
DSOit -0,00038***(8,81e-06) -0,00039***(8,50e-06) -0,000485*** (0,00001) 
ROAit 6,68066***    (1,3955) 15,0585***    (1,2853) 34,0952***    (2,29770) 
DLTit -4,43687***   (0,6946) -0,830428   (0,62518) -2,26967***   (0,52598) 
GROit -0,36206*** (0,00298) -0,36976***   (0,0026) -0,36960***   (0,00228) 
SZEit 2,75789***  (0,15083) 2,68571***    (0,1357) 2,88849***    (0,10254) 
DPAi,t-1 0,37868***  (0,00046) 0,37903***  (0,00041) 0,380136***  (0,00036) 
DROSit - -8,4585***   (0,18461) -5,43456***   (0,09424) 
DROAit - - -46,3762***   (2,43455) 
F (K;G-1) 40.562,39   (19;1321) 50.449,21   (20;1321) 63.978,32     (21;1321) 
Prob > F (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
z1 1,0e+05 (7) 1,1e+05 (8) 1,3e+05 (9) 
z2 1.534,55 (1) 1.987,20 (1) 1.667,74 (1) 
z3 182,27 (11) 226,82 (11) 261,18 (11) 
m1 -2,79 -2,80 -2,81 
m2 0,28 0,30 0,32 
Hansen 598 (364) 687,62 (415) 739,15 (466) 
Notes: The regressions are performed by using the pan l described in Table 1. DROSit is an interacted variable 
defined by a country dummy DUCO and ROSit in column II; DROAit is an interacted variable defined by a country 
dummy DUCO and ROAit in column III . The rest of information needed to read this table is: 1) Heteroskedasticity 
consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses; 2) Asteristic *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level; 3) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the country 
dummies and of the time dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no significance, 
degrees of freedom in parentheses; 4) mi is a serial correlation test of order i, using residuals in first differences, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation; 5) Hansen is a test of the over-
identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no correlation between the instruments 
and the error term, degrees of freedom in parenthesis ; 6) This regressions include 11 time dummies, one for each 





















Table 5 – Results of the Firm Characteristics (DROSit) 
Notes: The regressions are performed by using the pan l described in Table 1. DROSit is an interacted variable 
defined by a country dummy DUCO and ROSit in column III , IV and V;  DWCAit is a dummy variable that 
takes the following values: 1 if the working capital book value is negative and 0 otherwise in column IV and V. 
The rest of information needed to read this table is: 1) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error 
in parentheses; 2) Asteristic *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level; 3) z1, z2 and z3 are 
Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the country dummies and of the time 
dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no significance, degrees of freedom in 
parentheses; 4) mi is a serial correlation test of order i, using residuals in first differences, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation; 5) Hansen is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no correlation between the instruments and the 
error term, degrees of freedom in parenthesis ; 6) This regressions include 11 time dummies, one for each year 









Variable IV V VI 
Constant -4,72348**  (1,99273) -2,96191*      (1,7245) -4,7490**    (2,02016) 
BFLit -17,2613*** (1,38885) -23,6283***   (1,5576) -26,6203*** (1,50605) 
DSOit -0,00033***(8,17e-06) -0,00038***(7,90e-06) -0,00029***(8,00e-06) 
ROAit 12,6388***  (1,18420) 14,4086***    (1,1989) 12,1594***  (1,12762) 
DLTit -0,501738   (0,60300) -2,71369*** (0,58834) -0,849118   (0,58051) 
GROit -0,36892*** (0,00246) -0,38127*** (0,00242) -0,37140*** (0,00224) 
SZEit 3,37825***  (0,13855) 3,13527***  (0,13642) 3,67409***  (0,14312) 
DPAi,t-1 0,38121***  (0,00037) 0,38047***  (0,00034) 0,38286***  (0,00032) 
DROSit -8,79564*** (0,19209) -8,4595***   (0,18382) -8,49776*** (0,18005) 
FASit -6,41603*** (0,96813) - -13,072***   (0,96836) 
DWCAit - 11,2876***  (0,77685) 13,4353***  (0,74476) 
F (K;G-1) 59.608,34   (21;1321) 68.334,11   (21;1321) 75.826,42   (22;1321) 
Prob > F (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
z1 1,2e+05 (9) 1,5e+05 (9) 1,5e+05 (10) 
z2 1.703,17 (1) 1.989,38 (1) 1.829,03 (1) 
z3 231,05 (11) 222,90 (11) 232,08 (11) 
m1 -2,80 -2,79 -2,80 
m2 0,29 0,31 0,29 










Table 6 – Results of the Firm Characteristics (DROSit;DROA it) 
Notes: The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table 1. DROSit is an interacted 
variable defined by a country dummy DUCO and ROSit in column VIII , IX and X; DROAit is an interacted 
variable defined by a country dummy DUCO and ROAit in column VIII, IX and X;  DWCAit is a dummy 
variable that takes the following values: 1 if the working capital book value is negative and 0 otherwise in 
column IX and X. The rest of information needed to read this table is: 1) Heteroskedasticity consistent 
asymptotic standard error in parentheses; 2) Asteristic *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level; 3) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the country 
dummies and of the time dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no 
significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; 4) mi is a serial correlation test of order i, using residuals in 
first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation; 5) Hansen is a 
test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no correlation 
between the instruments and the error term, degrees of freedom in parenthesis ; 6) This regressions include 11 
time dummies, one for each year from 1992 to 2002. 
Variable VII VIII IX 
Constant -5,5365*** (1,48612) -4,7290***  (1,30789) -4,7555***    (1,4508) 
BFLit -18,1899*** (0,9315) -22,8522***  (1,2053) -26,0953***  (1,2162) 
DSOit -0,0004*** (0,00001) -0,0005***  (0,00001) -0,0004***  (0,00001) 
ROAit 33,5464***  (2,0765) 34,3703*** (2,15265) 33,6006***   (1,9884) 
DLTit -1,97265*** (0,5200) -3,9736***    (0,4913) -2,2167***    (0,4869) 
GROit -0,37233*** (0,0021) -0,38094***  (0,0021) -0,37497***  (0,0020) 
SZEit 3,46275***  (0,1061) 3,28043***   (0,1015) 3,69117***   (0,1066) 
DPAi,t-1 0,38192***  (0,0003) 0,38156***   (0,0003) 0,38364*** (0,00028) 
DROSit -5,8723*** (0,11172) -5,47252***(0,09292) -5,5995***  (0,10764) 
DROAit -47,5985*** (2,2149) -47,4140***  (0,6645) -48,0195***(2,13497) 
FASit -6,1341*** (0,82497) - -13,2081***  (0,8214) 
DWCAit - 9,66163*** (0,66448) 12,4764*** (0,65691) 
F (K;G-1) 71.203,16 (22;1321) 83,752,65  (22;1321) 92.333,55  (23;1321) 
Prob > F (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
z1 1,4e+05 (10) 1,7e+05 (10) 1,7e+05 (11) 
z2 1.341,94 (1) 1.712,73 (1) 1.511,48 (1) 
z3 278,65 (11) 270,93 (11) 275,38 (11) 
m1 -2,81 -2,80 -2,81 
m2 0,31 0,32 0,31 
Hansen 771,82 (517) 766,17 (517) 798,25 (568) 
